We address a game theoretical analysis of the leadership structure of two-echelon supply chains with a single supplier and a single retailer involving a risky supplier under demand uncertainty. The risky supplier has a risk of unavailability of delivering the product to the retailer. The equilibrium solutions for different leadership structures are analytically derived. The influence of the probability of risky supplier availability on the optimal leadership structure is investigated. The model is extended to consider a two-echelon supply chain with two risky suppliers. The total profits for each leadership structure are evaluated from the perspective of the entire supply chain. The analytical results show that the leadership structure with the risky supplier as a leader can maximize the total profit. Numerical examples are provided to show the validity of the proposed analysis.
Introduction
Supply chain management is the business process to achieve total optimization of supply chains comprising procurement, manufacturing, distribution and retailing. The range of supply chains has spread to multiple enterprises in global companies. In those situations, each enterprise in the supply chain has its own responsibilities for making decisions for their production, transportation and pricing in each regional market (Tominaga et al. 2008; Nishi et al. 2008) . Game theoretical analysis has been used to aid the decision making of competitions and cooperation in the supply chains (Cachon and Nettesie, 2004; Leng and Parlar, 2005) .
To establish a strategic alliance between enterprises, cooperative game theory is used to analyze how to distribute their profits obtained by the alliance. On the other hand, non-cooperative game theory is used to analyze equilibrium solutions and the profits when competitive enterprises make their decisions individually. Especially, in the two-echelon supply chain which is constituted by two or three companies, the selection of the leadership structure has a significant impact on the total profit of non-cooperative supply chain members. Xiao and Yang (2016) analyzed a two-echelon supply chain comprising one retailer and one supplier. They studied the effects of the tax on the carbon footprint of the product assuming the contract where the tax is borne by the retailer and the supplier. The effect of the leader-follower relationship represented by a tree graph on equilibrium solution was discussed when the retailer is a leader or the supplier is a leader in the non-cooperative game for the supply chain comprising three or more than three companies. These effects of leadership structures have been studied for many years in management science. Choi (1991) analyzed the leadership structure of the supply chain with one common retailer and two manufacturers. It is shown that the leadership structure to maximize the total profit depends on the demand function and the total profit is maximized when no one dominates the market with a linear demand. Choi and Fredj (2013) addressed the analysis of the supply chain model with a manufacturer and 1 Takuya TSUBOI * , Tatsushi NISHI * and Guoqing ZHANG Tsuboi, Nishi and Zhang, Journal of Advanced Mechanical Design, Systems, and Manufacturing, Vol.12, No.3 (2018) two retailers. They analyzed the leader-follower relationship between the manufacturer and two retailers, and between two retailers. Chung and Lee (2017) studied an asymmetric leader-follower relationship between the retailer and the manufacturers. Demand is uncertain in many cases. Then, it is necessary to consider the effect of the leadership under demand uncertainty (Nishi and Yoshida, 2016) . The effects of the leadership structures have been studied for the supply chain comprising two retailers and two manufacturers (Sakurai and Nishi, 2016) . Wu et al. (2016) applied the game theoretic analysis of the telecommunication supply chain where the Stackelberg model and the cooperative game theoretic model are compared. Yin et al. (2014) addressed an optimal coordination of the bi-level model with one manufacturer and multiple suppliers under demand uncertainty. In their study, the manufacturer is a leader who selects one of the contracted suppliers to maximize its own profit and the suppliers are followers. Yin et al. (2016) presented a game theoretical model that considers the quality risks in the multiple suppliers. They formulated two manufacturer's decision problems in the average case and worst case of supply uncertainty. A Stackelberg equilibrium is derived for the manufacturer and the suppliers. Uncertainty of product supply is also discussed along with demand uncertainty. There are some cases where products are not delivered appropriately when supply disruption occurs in supply chains (Shen and Li, 2017) . The plant shutdown caused by a disaster may cause serious damage to the supply chain of the automobile industries, etc. For instance, the total number of cars produced in Thailand in 2011 was decreased by 11.4% in 2010 due to Thailand's flood occurred in 2011 (Haraguchi and Lall, 2015) . The disaster held in Thailand 2011 affected both of domestic industries and the world's industrial production. The supply chain disruption in a certain area may affect the world economy. Product deliveries are not ensured when an earthquake occurs. The Great East Japan Earthquake had a major impact on the Japanese automobile industries. Therefore, retailers have to consider the supply risk when their orders are given to suppliers.
One way to avoid such risks is to allocate orders to multiple suppliers. By sharing the orders to multiple suppliers, the risk of the order quantity per supplier is reduced and the damage to the supply chain is minimized even if a supply disruption occurs. Mori et al. (2017) proposed a two objective optimization model that minimizes the sum of the total cost and the expected value of recovery time of the suppliers who were damaged to produce again in the multi-echelon supply chain. The optimal quantity of stock for emergency and how to distribute orders to multiple suppliers are determined. In their study, the retailer can place orders taking the possibility of supply disruption for each suppliers into account. On the other hand, suppliers who have supply risks attempt to obtain orders by setting a lower price than a normal wholesale price. It is revealed that there is a trade-off relationship between product price and supply risk. Serel (2008) developed the supply chain model with a single retailer, a single supplier and a single risky supplier under demand uncertainly. There are two types of suppliers dealing with the same product. The normal supplier can reliably deliver the products. On the other hand, the risky supplier can deliver products according to the probability of supply availability. The availability of the risky supplier depends on the probability of supplier availability. A Stackelberg game is derived when the supplier and the risky supplier are the leaders and the retailer is the follower. The supplier and the risky supplier determine their own wholesale prices of the product based on the orders from the retailer's optimal response function. Then, the retailer decides how to distribute orders to the supplier and the risky supplier given their wholesale prices. In this situation, it is shown that there is a competitive relationship between the supplier and the risky supplier. However, the leadership structure in the supply chains with risky supplier has not been discussed so far. To achieve the total optimization, it is necessary to investigate the impact of the probability of risky supplier availability to the total profit of the supply chain with each of the leadership structures considered in this paper. We have provided an analysis of the effects of the leadership structure (Tsuboi and Nishi, 2017) .
However, the equilibrium solutions for different leadership structures were not evaluated and two or more than two risky suppliers were not studied previously. In practice, there are many suppliers in the supply chain. The leadership structure becomes more complex when the number of the suppliers is increased. In the hierarchical decision making with a three-level vertical structure consisting of three entities, the decision-makers are respectively termed the top-level leader, the middle-level follower and the bottom-level follower. The objective of this paper is to investigate the impact of the leadership structure of the supply chain with one or two risky suppliers to their pricing decisions. We derive propositions and theorems to investigate the dominance relation between different leadership structures. The contribution of this paper is summarized as follows.
( 1 ) The explicit form of the equilibrium solutions is derived for the supply chain with different leadership structures between a supplier and a risky supplier.
( 2 ) The effects of the probability of risky supplier availability on the total profit of the supply chain are investigated. We show that the leadership structure with the risky supplier as the top-level leader can maximize the total expected profit.
( 3 ) The leadership structure of the supply chain with two risky suppliers is analyzed. The effects of the leadership structure on the total profit are investigated. The results show that the supply chains with risky suppliers as leaders are suitable from the viewpoint of the total optimization even when the number of the risky suppliers is increased.
The paper is organized by the following sections. In Section 2, the problem definition is explained. In Section 3, the retailer's newsvendor problem and the pricing game between the supplier and the risky supplier are introduced for the decentralized decision making in the supply chain. We derive the equilibrium solutions for the decentralized decision making in the supply chain. In Section 4, the analytical forms of the equilibrium solutions are derived for the supply chain involving a risky supplier. Then, we develop some propositions on the probability of risky supplier availability and the leadership structure. In Section 5, we propose the supply chain model with two risky suppliers to analyze the leadership structures for the proposed model. In Section 6, some numerical examples are provided to confirm the propositions. In Section 7, we conclude this research and state future works.
Problem description
Let us consider a two-echelon supply chain for a single retailer and two suppliers in a single period as shown in Fig. 1 . The retailer determines the order quantity to maximize its expected profit. The suppliers determine their wholesale prices to maximize each expected profit. The product purchased by the retailer from the suppliers is sold to customers at a given retail price. We assume that there is a normal supplier and a risky supplier. The normal supplier can deliver the product reliably. The risky supplier has supply risk and its supply availability depends on the probability parameter. Both suppliers have the same production cost. The retailer optimally allocates the orders to the two suppliers. We consider the equilibrium between the supply chains. A Bernoulli trial is used to represent the probability of risky supplier availability (Serel, 2008) . The probability that the retailer will be able to purchase any product from the risky supplier is u and the probability is 1 − u that no amount of product will be available from the risky supplier for immediate delivery. The retailer's demand is assumed to be uncertain. In general, the quantity of demand depends on the retail price of the product. The demand follows a probability distribution. The retailer determines the order quantity R units from the normal supplier and the order quantity S − R units to the risky supplier where the total order quantity is S units. The supplier and the risky supplier individually determine their own wholesale prices w n and w r , respectively.
If the risky supplier is available, the retailer orders both the supplier and the risky supplier. On the other hand, if the risky supplier is unavailable, the retailer orders only the normal supplier. If the product stock shortage occurs, the opportunity loss penalty is imposed to the retailer. If the product is unsold at the end of the term, the unsold stock is resold to the customer at the salvage price. In practice, the retailer determines the order quantity when the wholesale price is given. Therefore, we consider the Stackelberg game between the retailer and the suppliers where the retailer is always the follower of both of the normal supplier and the risky supplier. There is the competition between the suppliers in the supply chain. In many cases, the supplier who enters the market earlier becomes a leader and the supplier who enters the market later is a follower. The leader-follower relationship between suppliers depends on the timing of market entry for each supplier. Also, the relationship between the suppliers with different properties greatly affects the supply chain. Luo et al. (2017) studied the leader-follower relationship between the supplier who deals with a good brand product and the supplier who deals with an average brand product.
From above discussion, in this paper, we consider the leader-follower relationship between the suppliers. The wholesale price for the normal supplier is higher, but that for the risky supplier is assumed to be lower in this study. In this case, we can consider three types of alternative leadership structures: the supplier and the risky supplier determine the wholesale price individually (Model Vertical Nash (VN)), the normal supplier is the leader (Model Supplier-Stackelberg (SS)) and the risky supplier is the leader (Model Risky supplier-Stackelberg (RS)) as shown in Fig. 2 .
( 1 ) Vertical Nash (VN) Each supplier individually chooses its wholesale price by using its forecast of the retailer's reaction. The retailer determines the order quantity on the condition that the respective wholesale prices are given.
( 2 ) Supplier-Stackelberg (SS) The normal supplier chooses a wholesale price by using its forecast of the risky supplier's reactions. The risky supplier chooses a wholesale price by using its forecast of the retailer's reaction on the condition that the normal supplier's wholesale prices are given. The retailer determines the order quantity on the condition that the respective wholesale prices are given.
( 3 ) Risky supplier-Stackelberg (RS) The risky supplier chooses a wholesale price using its forecast of the normal supplier's reaction. The normal supplier chooses a wholesale price using its forecast of the retailer's reaction on the condition that the risky supplier's wholesale prices are given. The retailer determines the order quantity on the condition that the respective wholesale prices are given. We analyze the above three structures and discuss the results by game theoretical analysis in the following sections.
Game Theoretical Analysis of Supply Chains involving Risky Supplier

Formulation
Parameters, variables and constants are defined as follows.
[Parameters] a : lower bound of the interval on probability distribution b : upper bound of the interval on probability distribution c : unit production cost of the product D p : uncertain demand for the product with respect to retail price p d(p) : demand function for the product with respect to retail price p f () : probability density function of demand ϵ F() : cumulative distribution function of demand ϵ l : unit inventory shortage cost p : unit retail price of the product for the retailer u : probability of risky supplier availability ϵ : random weight variable of the demand τ : unit salvage price of the product
[Decision variables]
B : retailer's expected profit MAIN : normal supplier's expected profit R : order quantity to the normal supplier S : total order quantity S U B : risky supplier's expected profit X : order quantity to the supplier per unit demand Y : total order quantity per unit demand w n : supplier's wholesale price w r : risky supplier's wholesale price (w r < w n is assumed)
The retailer's decision problem
First, we consider the retailer's problem that determines the order quantity to obtain the retailer's optimal response function. Let p be the retail price of the product, τ be the salvage price and l be the shortage cost. Then, we represent uncertain demand for the product D p as the multiplicative form D p = d(p)ϵ for some random variable ϵ (Bernstein and Federgruen, 2005) . We assume that its expected value is one. Therefore, the expectation of the uncertain demand is
Hence, the transformation on uncertain demand is reasonable. By the way, the retail price p is a parameter in this model. Therefore, the problem to determine R and S is equivalent to the problem to determine 
Because the risky supplier is unavailable with probability 1 − u, the retailer orders only to the normal supplier. If the risky supplier is available, the retailer orders to both of the normal supplier and the risky supplier. Therefore, the first line of Eq. (1) is the expected profit when the risky supplier is unavailable. The first term is the sales profit, and the second term is the period-end sale loss, and the third term is the opportunity loss penalty. The second line of Eq. (1) is the expected profit when the risky supplier is available. The order quantity is equal or more than 0 and the order quantity to the supplier is not larger than the total order quantity. Therefore, the retailer determines X and Y to maximize the expected profit under the constraint. The retailer's decision problem is formulated as follows.
∂Y 2 < 0, and
is a concave function with respect to X and Y. Hence, the optimal solution is obtained from the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) condition as follows.
from 0 < R. From these relations, wholesales prices w n and w r should satisfy w r < w n < (1 − u)(p + l) + uw r .
The pricing game between the supplier and the risky supplier
The supplier and the risky supplier individually determine their own wholesale prices based on the expected order quantity of the retailer. Let c be the unit production cost. The expected profit functions of the normal supplier MAIN and that of the risky supplier S U B are expressed as follows.
Therefore, Eqs. (2) and (3) are substituted into Eqs. (4) and (5). Then, we can derive their optimal wholesale prices. For Model SS and Model RS, the optimal response function of the middle-level follower is required to derive the optimal solution of the top-level leader. The response function of the retailer is obtained by the inverse function of the cumulative distribution function (ICDF). In order to derive the optimal wholesale prices analytically, we establish the assumptions as follows. Under uncertain demands, it is assumed that demand follows the normal distribution in many cases. The cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the normal distribution is expressed by using the error function. However, it is difficult to derive the analytic solutions by using the ICDF of the normal distribution. In general, the CDF of the uniform distribution is obtained by
We set the parameters a = 0 and b = 2 to eliminate the constant terms of F −1 (x). This make it easier to derive the total profit function of each model analytically.
Therefore, the ICDF of the uniform distribution is represented by F −1 (x) = 2x (0 ≤ x ≤ 1). By using this assumption, we can easily derive the analytical solutions to investigate impact of the leadership structure between a supplier and one or two risky suppliers without loss of generality. This is satisfied with the condition that the expected value of the random variable is one. However, the propositions in the following sections hold even when we set parameters 0 ≤ a < 1 and b = 2 − a.
Centralized decision making
The solution of the centralized decision making is derived to compare with that of the decentralized decision making. In the centralized decision making, we assume that the retailer, the supplier and the risky supplier as one company to maximize the total expected profit. Let Π be the total expected profit. In general, the total expected profit for the centralized decision making is no less than the sum of the expected profits for decentralized decision makings. The total expected profit Π is derived as follows.
Therefore, we need to solve the following problem.
By solving this problem, we can obtain the optimal order quantity for the centralized decision making as follows.
From Eqs. (7) and (8), the retailer orders only to the supplier regardless of the probability of risky supplier availability. And, the maximum Π * of the sum of the expected profits is as follows.
The total expected profit for centralized decision making is always larger than that of each model for decentralized decision making.
Main results
We show that the analytical solutions of each model and propositions and proofs derived from them.
Analytical solutions
The analytical solutions are derived by the following procedure. In Model VN, we derive a Nash equilibrium for the supplier and the risky supplier by using the first-order condition (FOC). Then, the wholesale prices are substituted into Eqs. (2) and (3) to obtain the order quantity R and S . In Model SS, we need to obtain the optimal response function of the risky supplier. The optimal response function of the risky supplier is substituted into Eq. (4) to derive a Stackelberg equilibrium for the supplier. Then, the supplier's wholesale price is substituted into the optimal response function of the risky supplier to obtain a Stackelberg solution of the risky supplier. Finally, we substitute wholesale prices into Eqs. (2) and (3) to obtain the order quantity R and S . In Model RS, we derive the solutions in the same way of Model SS. The equilibrium solutions for each model are described in Table 1 . 
4.2. Impact of the probability of risky supplier availability on the equilibrium solutions The following proposition is proved to show the impact of the probability of risky supplier availability.
Proposition 1 The wholesale prices w
j n , w j r ( j = V N,
S S , RS ) are monotonically decreased when the probability of risky supplier availability increases.
Proof It is sufficient to show that
To increase the probability of risky supplier availability u is equivalent to the increase of the possibility that the risky supplier can enter into the market. Proposition 1 implies that both of the supplier and the risky supplier lower their wholesale prices to obtain much more orders as the possibility of their competition increases.
Impact of the leader-follower relationship on equilibrium solutions
We have also the following proposition.
Proposition 2 The supplier's wholesale prices of each model satisfies the following inequality:
Proposition 2 implies that the supplier can set the supplier's wholesale price highest when the supplier is a leader (Model SS). Also, the supplier's wholesale price without leader-follower relationship is lower than that with the leaderfollower relationship. This is because that they have competitions without forecasting each decision when there is no Tsuboi, Nishi and Zhang, Journal of Advanced Mechanical Design, Systems, and Manufacturing, Vol.12, No.3 (2018) leader-follower relationship between them. Therefore, they reduce their wholesale prices more than it is necessary. On the other hand, the follower can set the follower's wholesale price considering the leader's decision when there is a leaderfollower relationship between them. Therefore, the supplier can set the supplier's wholesale price relatively higher even when the supplier is the follower.
The following proposition relates to the wholesale prices of the risky supplier. Table 1 .
Similarly, from Proposition 2, the risky supplier's wholesale price without the leader-follower relationship is lower than the one with the relationship between them.
We discuss the expected profits and the total expected profit.
Lemma 1 The retailer's expected profit functions satisfy the following inequality: B V N > B RS > B S S .
Proof
The retailer's expected profit is the largest when the supplier and the risky supplier determine their wholesale price equally (Model VN). As explained in Propositions 2 and 3, the supplier's and the risky supplier's wholesale prices are the lowest in Model VN. Therefore, the retailer can place much more orders than in other models and the retailer's expected profit is also expected to increase.
Lemma 2 The supplier's expected profit functions satisfy the following relations: MAIN
Contrary to the retailer, the supplier's expected profit is the lowest because the supplier's wholesale price is the lowest in Model VN. The expected profit when the supplier is the follower (Model RS) is higher than that when the supplier is the leader (Model SS). In Model SS, the supplier maximizes the supplier's expected profit to set the supplier's order quantity constant and the supplier's wholesale price higher regardless of the probability of risky supplier availability. On the other hand, in Model RS, the supplier can set the supplier's wholesale price relatively higher even if the supplier is the follower as in Proposition 2. In addition, the orders to the supplier are increased when the probability of risky supplier availability increases in Model RS. Under these conditions, the supplier's expected profit function is the largest in Model RS. It indicates that being a leader of decision-making does not always lead to generate better profits.
We have also the following lemma.
Lemma 3 The risky supplier's expected profit functions satisfy the following relations:S U B S S > S U B RS > S U B V N .
Proof
S U B S S − S U B RS
Tsuboi, Nishi and Zhang, Journal of Advanced Mechanical Design, Systems, and Manufacturing, Vol.12, No.3 (2018) Similarly, from Lemma 2, the same is true for the risky supplier. Therefore, it is shown that the risky supplier's expected profit function is the lowest in Model VN and the highest in Model SS from these three cases. From these lemma, we derive the following theorem.
Theorem 1 The total expected profit functions of each model satisfies the following relations:
Since the expected profit of the risky supplier is always less than that of the retailer or the supplier, the proportion of the risky supplier's profits in the total expected profit is less. Therefore, the leadership structure that increases the expected profit of the retailer or the supplier, can increase the total expected profit.
Game theoretical analysis for a single retailer and three suppliers with two risky suppliers
The competition between one supplier and one risky supplier is investigated in the previous section. In practice, there are more suppliers in the supply chain. Therefore, we extended the model into the supply chain involving two risky suppliers. In the extended model, the supply chain comprises one retailer, one supplier and two risky suppliers. These two risky suppliers as denoted as risky supplier 1 and risky supplier 2. Risky supplier 1 and risky supplier 2 are different because each probability of risky supplier availability may be different. The retailer determines the order quantity to each supplier. The supplier and the risky suppliers individually determine its own wholesale price, respectively. The probability that the risky supplier i can deliver the product to the retailer is u i , and the probability of supply unavailability is 1 − u i . Therefore, there are four scenarios on the risky suppliers in this model.
• Risky supplier 1 and risky supplier 2 are available.
• Risky supplier 1 is only available.
• Risky supplier 2 is only available.
• Risky supplier 1 and risky supplier 2 are unavailable.
The retailer's decision problem
The retailer determines the order quantity R units to the supplier, the order quantity S units to the risky supplier 1 and the order quantity T units to the risky supplier 2. the retailer's expected profit is the sum of the expected profit of each scenario as shown in Section 3.2. Assuming that
Then, we assume ϵ follows U[0, 2]. The first derivative of the expected profit respect to each decision variable is as follows.
Also, the second derivative of the expected profit is
and
2 , respectively. The Hessian matrix H of the expected profit function is derived.
In order to show the concavity of the retailer's profit function, it is necessary for the principal minor of the Hessian matrix of order n, H n to satisfy the inequality (−1) n H n > 0. In this case,
is a concave function with respect to X and Y and Z. Therefore, the optimal solution is obtained from 
The pricing game between the supplier and the risky suppliers
The expected profit functions of the supplier: MAIN , of the risky supplier 1: S U B and of the risky supplier 2: S U B2 are written as follows.
MAIN(w n
In this model, we can consider nine types of alternative structures to derive analytical solutions by using the procedure. All alternative structures are illustrated in Fig. 3 . In Fig. 3 , "A > B" means that A is a leader and B is a follower and "A-B" means A and B are in an equal power relationship. For example, the structures S − R1 − R2 and R1 − S − R2 are totally equivalent because S , R1, and R2 are in an equal power relationship. However, the structures S − R2 > R1 and S − R1 > R2 are different when each probability of risky supplier availability u is different for R1 and R2. Also, "S-R1>R2" means that the supplier and the risky supplier 1 are leaders and they are in an equal power relationship and the risky supplier 2 is a follower. We derive the equilibrium of wholesale prices for each structure in the same way.
Analytical results
The equilibrium solutions are also obtained for each model in three suppliers with two risky suppliers. The analytical solutions are omitted due to the complexity of their mathematical representations and space limitation.
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We have the following results.
Proposition 4
The wholesale prices w n , w r and w r2 for each model are monotonically decreasing as the probability of risky supplier availability increases.
To increase either the probability u 1 of the risky supplier 1 or the probability u 2 of the risky supplier 2 leads to increase of the competition of the supply chain. The supplier and the risky suppliers result in lowering their wholesale prices to obtain much more orders when the possibility of their competition increases as well as Proposition 1. This is the same for the two risky suppliers case. 5.3.2. Impact of the leader-follower relationship on the total profit
We discuss the impact of the leader-follower relationship on the total profit. The total profit composes the retailer's profit, the supplier's profit and the risky suppliers' profit. We show the proposition on the total profit assuming that the probability of risky supplier 1 is equal to the probability of risky supplier 2, i.e. u 1 = u 2 = u. In other words, the risky supplier R1 and the risky supplier R2 are mathematically equivalent. In such a situation, we can derive the following proposition.
Proposition 5 The total expected profit functions of each model satisfy the following relations:
Proposition 5 indicates the leadership structure that has the risky suppliers as leaders can maximize total expected profit even when the number of the risky suppliers is increased.
Numerical examples
In this section, we examine the validity of the propositions and the insights and discussion on the effects of probability to the total profit of the supply chain are provided.
Supply chains with a single retailer and two suppliers with a single risky supplier
The following parameters p = 15, c = 6, τ = 4, l = 4, d(p) = α − βp, α = 5 and β = 0.2 are assumed. The retail price and the production cost are set taking into account the wholesale prices that change according to the supply probability. The salvage price and the inventory shortage cost are set relatively lower than the retail price. We assume that demand function is linear. Figure 4 illustrates the values of the wholesale prices w n and w r for each model when the probability u is changed in the range of 0 to 1. Relationship between the probability of risky supplier availability u and the wholesale prices w n , w r
As shown in Proposition 1, it is confirmed that wholesale prices are decreasing as the probability of risky supplier availability increases in all models. It can be seen that the wholesale price of the risky supplier is set lower than the wholesale price of the supplier. That is, we can recognize that there are two types of suppliers -the supplier who is sure to deliver, but wholesale price is higher and the risky supplier whose delivery uncertain, but wholesale price is lower. If the probability of risky supplier availability u is lower, the difference in the wholesale prices of the supplier and the risky supplier is larger. In such a case, the retailer tends to request orders to the normal supplier. In addition, the possibility of competition with the risky supplier is less. Therefore, the normal supplier can set wholesale price higher. On the other hand, the risky supplier makes efforts to increase the order quantity by lowering the risky supplier's wholesale price in order to compensate for less order quantity due to its low delivery possibility. As a result, the difference in the wholesale prices of the supplier and the risky supplier becomes large. However, the possibility of competition is increasing as the probability of risky supplier availability increases. Therefore, the difference in the wholesale prices of the supplier and the risky supplier is less when the probability of risky supplier availability increases. Relationship between the probability of risky supplier availability u and the total expected profit Figure 5 shows the effects of the probability of risky supplier availability u on the total expected profit. The total expected profits increase as the probability of risky supplier availability increases. In particular, when u → 1 , the total expected profits for each model corresponds to the global optimum derived by the centralized decision making. This is because the supplier and the risky supplier set their own wholesale prices lower as the probability of risky supplier availability increases and when u → 1, w n → c and w r → c. When the probability of risky supplier availability u is higher, the possibility of competition also increases. The supplier and the risky supplier attempt to gain even a slight profit by setting the wholesale prices lower and obtaining orders. If the probability of risky supplier availability u is very close to 1, the supplier and the risky supplier set their wholesale prices lower as much as possible. Then the wholesale prices approach to the production cost. As a result, the supplier's and the risky supplier's expected profits become zero. The situation when the retailer makes orders to maximize its own profit is the same with the situation of centralized decision making.
Supply chains with a single retailer and three suppliers with two risky suppliers
We show some numerical examples of the total profit of the supply chain with a single retailer and three suppliers with two risky suppliers. The parameters p = 15, c = 6, τ = 4, l = 4, d(p) = α − βp, α = 5 and β = 0.2 are assumed as well as in the previous section. In this section, we also investigate the cases when u 1 u 2 . Then, four cases: case LL, case LH, case HL, case HH are investigated. In case LL, the probabilities of risky supplier 1 availability and risky supplier 2 availability are low. In case LH, the probability of risky supplier 1 availability is low and the probability of risky supplier 2 availability is high. In case HL, the probability of risky supplier 1 availability is high and the probability of risky supplier 2 availability is low. In case HH, the probabilities of risky supplier 1 availability and risky supplier 2 availability are high. In the setting, u i = 0.8 when the probability of risky supplier availability is high, and u i = 0.2 when the probability of risky supplier availability is low. Table 2 shows the results of the total profit for nine leadership structures of Fig. 3 for four cases of LL, LH, HL and HH. From the results in Table 2 , Π S >R1−R2 is the least and Π R1−R2>S is the largest for case LL and case HH as shown in Proposition 5. On the other hand, when the probability of risky supplier 1 availability is different from that of the risky supplier 2, the leadership structure when the risky supplier who has a high probability of supply availability is a leader, can lead to larger total profit. In the same way as Theorem 1, the total profit is higher when the risky supplier is a leader and the supplier is a follower. Also, these results indicate that the total profit depends on the relationship between the supplier and the risky suppliers, however, the depth of the leadership structure between suppliers does not affect the total profit.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have provided a game theoretical analysis on the leadership structure for the supply chain involving the risky suppliers. We derived the analytical solutions of the equilibrium of three models and some properties on the wholesale prices and the expected profits. The main result is that the leader-follower structure that has the risky supplier as the leader can maximize total expected profit. We have shown that the result also holds true even when the number of the risky suppliers increases. In our future works, we will extend our analysis when the retailer is a leader and study non-cooperative and cooperative game theoretic situations.
